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Does Credit Composition Have Asymmetric Effects on Income Inequality? 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies the effects of credit to private non-financial sectors on income inequality. In 
particular, we focus on the distinction between household and firm credit, and investigate 
whether these two types of credit have adverse effects on income inequality. Using balanced 
panel data for 30 developed and developing countries over the period of 1995-2013, we show that 
firm credit reduces income inequality whereas there is no significant impact of household credit 
on income inequality. We conclude that not the size of private credit but the composition of it 
matters for reducing income inequality due to the asymmetric effects of different types of credit. 
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1. Introduction 
The impact of financial development on economic growth has long been at the center of the 
theoretical and empirical finance literature. Although a vast literature emphasizes that financial 
development contributes to subsequent economic growth1 by relaxing financial constraints that 
corrects capital misallocation and mitigates productivity losses, there is a paucity of research with 
respect to the finance-inequality nexus. Although it is known that income inequality has 
increased over the past quarter-century2, the exact impact of financial development on income 
inequality has not been well defined in both empirical studies and the theoretical literature. The 
vast majority of the empirical finance-inequality studies find that financial development lead to 
less income inequality, suggesting more finance is good for the poor. 3 However, the literature has 
mainly focused on private credit, higher levels of which indicate more-developed financial 
systems and easier access to credit for entrepreneurs and households, while examining the 
linkages between financial development and income inequality (see, e.g., Clarke et al., 2006; 
Kappel, 2010; Beck et al., 2007; Law and Tan, 2009). Since these two types of borrowers, 
namely entrepreneurs and households, vary in terms of the use of credit, they might have 
different effects on the level of income inequality. Therefore, understanding whether firm credit, 
                                                          
1 Papers including Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), King and Levine (1993a), Bencivenga et al. 
(1995), Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), Beck and Levine (2004), and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2008) report 
positive association between financial development and economic growth. See Robinson (1952), Lucas (1988), 
Naceur and Ghazouani (2007), Harris (1997), and Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) for papers reporting negative or 
statistically insignificant association between financial development and economic growth. See Levine (2005) for 
comprehensive reviews of the related literature.  
2 While global inequality has declined mainly thanks to the development spurt of China and India, inequality within 
individual countries has worsened in a remarkably consistent fashion in both the developed and developing countries 
over the last three decades. 
3 Papers including Li, Squire and Zou (1998), Clarke et al. (2006), Beck et al. (2007), Dollar and Kraay (2002), 
Ravallion (2001), Kappel (2010), Uddin et al. (2014), and Abosedra et al. (2016) report negative relationship 
between financial development and income inequality, namely that financial development reduces income inequality. 
On the other hand, Charlton (2008), Law and Tan (2009), Jauch and Watzka (2015), and Seven and Coskun (2016) 
report negative or statistically insignificant relation between finance and income inequality/poverty. See Seven and 
Coskun (2016) for a broad review of the related literature. 
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household credit or both contribute to reducing income inequality can help policymakers who are 
interested in achieving a more equal income distribution. 
In this paper, we study the link between the two components of private credit and income 
inequality. We argue that analyzing the separate effects of household and firm credit is more 
important for explaining the role of credit in income inequality than the size of total private credit 
per se due to two main reasons. First, theory points to different channels through which private 
credit can reduce income inequality. On the one hand, household credit enables the poor to invest 
in their human capital and health activities, hence reducing income inequality (Galor and Zeira, 
1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993). On the other hand, countries with higher levels of financial 
development might experience more efficient capital allocation across entrepreneurs (incumbent 
and new), higher economic growth and lower income inequality, an effect, which can be captured 
by firm credit (Gine and Townsend, 2004; Beck, Levine and Levkov, 2010; Beck et al., 2012; 
Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). In that aspect, understanding the exact mechanism of generating less 
income inequality through providing credit requires a more nuanced analysis. Second, the ratio of 
household credit to firm credit is above 0.5 for many developed and developing countries in our 
sample, and an increasing proportion of private credit has been given to the households rather 
than entrepreneurs over the last two decades (Figure 1). Since the proportion of household credit 
in total private credit has been substantially increasing and there have been increasing concerns 
both on the adverse effects of household debt burden and credit growth, especially in developing 
countries, focusing only on the size of private credit does not sit very well with reality. Therefore, 
exploring the decomposition of private credit becomes highly relevant for both economic growth 
and income inequality policies. 
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FIGURE 1. The Ratio of Household Credit to Firm Credit (Annual Data, 1995-2013) 
Source: BIS, Authors’ calculations. 
 
In this respect, we extend finance-inequality literature by decomposing the effects of firm 
and household credit on income inequality. In particular, we differentiate between household 
credit and firm credit while the literature has mostly focused on the total credit to private sector. 
Therefore, this research contributes to the literature by identifying the heterogeneous behavior of 
income inequality (measured by GINI coefficient) in response to (i) credit to non-financial 
corporations (firm credit), and (ii) credit to households and non-profit institutions serving 
households (NPISHs) (household credit) across 30 developed and developing countries. 
Moreover, we contribute to the literature on the finance-inequality nexus also by estimating the 
effect of total credit to private non-financial sectors (total private credit), a common measure of 
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financial development, on income inequality. The empirical analysis is based on balanced panel 
data including annual observations for 30 selected countries over the period between 1995 and 
2013. To that end, the Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCEMG) estimator proposed 
by Pesaran (2006), and Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator proposed by Eberhardt and 
Bond (2009) are employed. Contrary to the existing literature, these methods take into account 
the cross-sectional dependence that may arise from economic integration of countries and/or 
common financial, political and social shocks, and provide both the common and the country-
specific estimations. We also include trade openness, foreign direct investment inward stock, 
government final consumption expenditure, and corruption index as control variables, which are 
selected from the related literature and expected to affect income inequality. We show that the 
response of income inequality to credit to non-financial corporations is significant and negative, 
whereas credit to households and NPISHs is insignificant. Moreover, the effect of total private 
credit on income inequality is negative but statistically insignificant. These results suggest that 
the composition of funds between households and firms has key implications for policies to 
tackle income inequality. When these two types of credit have different effects on the level of 
income inequality, the composition becomes even more important. This is because when 
policymakers are confronted with the need to restrict (or expand) credit growth, they should pay 
particular attention to the asymmetric effects that household and firm credit have on income 
inequality. Hence, the composition of credit can support policymakers by enabling them to 
understand whether, and in which context private credit is an instrument that can influence 
income inequality, and whether the size of the total credit is always good for the poor. 
Our study is further related to both the empirical and theoretical studies on the distinction 
between household and firm credit, all of which show that the composition of private credit 
matters for different macroeconomic variables. For example, Japelli and Pagano (1994) find that 
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an increase in household credit decreases saving rates for a sample of OECD countries. 
Büyükkarabacak and Krause (2009) suggest that the composition of credit does matter for the 
trade balance such that lending to consumers has a negative effect on net exports, while firm 
loans contribute to a rise in net exports. Moreover, Bahadir and Gumus (2016), using a two-
sector real business cycle model of a small open economy, analyze the differential effects of 
household and business credit dynamics on business cycles in emerging market economies. Their 
results suggest that the two types of credit shocks generate different dynamics in sectoral input 
and output levels as well as the real exchange rate.  
Although there is a bunch of research distinguishes between the components of private 
credit, to the best of our knowledge, the only empirical research on the finance-inequality nexus 
that distinguishes between household and firm credit is Beck et al., (2012). Their paper examines 
the differential effects of household and enterprise credit on economic growth, income inequality 
and poverty. The authors find negative relation between enterprise credit and growth of Gini 
coefficient, but no statistically significant impact of household credit. However, Beck et al., 
(2012) use cross-country data (only 33 observations in their sample) for the period of 1992-2005. 
Moreover, they do not control for the cross sectional dependence. The distinguishing features of 
our paper are that we (i) provide both country-specific and panel estimates, (ii) take into account 
the cross-sectional dependence, (iii) use a comprehensive and updated data set, and (iv) employ 
cross-section augmented cointegrating regressions.  Our findings are in line with the theoretical 
predictions of Gine and Townsend (2004) and Beck, Levine and Levkov (2010), those of which 
suggest that the impact of private credit on reducing income inequality goes through firm credit 
rather than household credit, and contradicting with theories focusing on credit for the poor 
helping them to exit poverty by investing in human capital, health and microenterprises activities 
(Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993). 
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The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our data and provides visual 
evidence for the hypothesis we test. Section 3 explains the details of the employed empirical 
strategy. Section 4 discusses and interprets the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data Description 
We combine country-level annual data gathered from five sources: the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIID), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Statistics, the 
World Bank World Development Indicators, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Database, 
and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Statistics. The sample 
consists of 30 developed and developing countries covering 19 consecutive years – i.e., the 
period 1995-2013.4 The choices of country set and data period are shaped by data availability 
concerns. In particular, we focus on countries having no missing value for any of our selected 
variables over time.  
Our analysis is based on three main variables: (i) Gini coefficient, (ii) credit to non-
financial corporations (TCF), and (iii) credit to households and non-profit institutions serving 
households (TCH). The dependent variable is the market Gini coefficient, indicated by 
GINIMARKET, which is drawn from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(SWIID) and constructed by Solt (2009) using the Luxembourg Income Study as the harmonized 
benchmark for comparable estimates. The SWIID is our preferred source of data on income 
inequality as it provides comparable figures across countries and over a longer span of time. The 
market Gini coefficient is calculated on income before taxes and transfers, and it measures 
inequality in income distribution without considering the effect of taxes and social spending 
                                                          
4 The sample consist of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and the 
United States of America. 
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already in place in a country. We have also used the net Gini coefficient (after taxes and 
transfers), indicated by GININET.  
Our main explanatory variables, credit to non-financial corporations and credit to 
households and NPISHs, which have been used interchangeably, are retrieved from the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) Statistics. It would be helpful briefly summarizing the content of 
the data to better understand the structure of the BIS data on private credit. The BIS has 
constructed long series on credit to the private non-financial sector for both advanced and 
emerging economies. Credit is provided by domestic banks, all other sectors of the economy and 
non-residents. The private non-financial sector includes non-financial corporations (both private-
owned and public owned), households and non-profit institutions serving households. In terms of 
financial instruments, credit covers loans and debt securities. The data for each country include 
(i) credit to private non-financial sectors by domestic banks and (ii) total credit to private non-
financial sectors. Moreover, total credit is broken down into (iii) credit to non-financial 
corporations and (iv) credit to households and non-profit institutions serving households. Hence, 
credit to non-financial corporations as a percentage of GDP and credit to households and non-
profit institutions serving households as a percentage of GDP, both of which are in market values 
and adjusted for breaks, are used as explanatory variables in the analysis. 
To assess the strength of the linkage between credit components and income inequality, 
we control other potential determinants of income inequality in the regressions. We use four 
control variables that are widely employed in the related literature. These variables are also 
introduced into the model as a test of robustness. First, we include the ratio of trade to GDP 
(TRADE) to capture the degree of openness of an economy. Second, the ratio government final 
consumption expenditure to GDP (GGFCE) is used to measure macroeconomic stability. Third, 
to measure the level of institutional quality we use corruption index (CORR), lower values of 
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which indicate higher level of corruption (or lower institutional quality), hence, expecting that 
lower values of corruption index should be associated with a higher level of income inequality as 
it shows how corrupt the public sector is. Finally, we control for the foreign direct investment 
inward stock to GDP ratio (FDI). The source of data of TRADE and GGFCE is the World Bank 
DataBank. The data of CORR is compiled from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Database whereas the data of FDI are extracted from United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) Statistics.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis. 
There are considerable variations in our variables across countries. For example, the market Gini 
coefficient ranges from a low of 29.66% to 58.59%. Household credit to GDP and firm credit to 
GDP ratios also show significant variations, with TCH ranging from 0.9% to 118.8% and TCF 
from 12.2% to 197.5%. Figure 2 displays the visual evidence representing the raw correlations 
between our main explanatory variables (household and firm credit) and the dependent variable 
(the market Gini coefficient). 
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
GINIMARKET (%) 570 47.07 4.42 29.66 58.59 
GININET(%) 570 32.94 7.37 21.58 55.50 
TCF (% of GDP) 570 77.35 34.60 12.2 197.5 
TCH (% of GDP) 570 47.04 27.98 0.9 118.8 
CORR 570 3.88 1.29 1 6 
GGFCE (% of GDP) 570 18.39 4.45 8.03 28.06 
FDI (% of GDP) 570 44.05 66.72 0.63 542.49 
TRADE (% of GDP) 570 89.26 80.38 15.64 455.28 
Notes: Std. Dev., Min. and Max. denote standard deviation, minimum and maximum, respectively.  
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FIGURE 2. Visual evidence 
 
 
Notes: The figures provide a visual representation of the unconditional relationship between firm credit to GDP ratio 
and the market Gini coefficient in the upper panel, and household credit to GDP ratio and the market Gini coefficient 
in the lower panel. All values are in natural logarithms. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
The goal is to develop an empirical strategy that would enable us to estimate the distinguished 
effects of household and firm credit on the level of income inequality given the country-level data 
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set we have. While several alternative measures of income inequality can be used in the analysis, 
we prefer to focus on two measures of income inequality, which are also the measures most 
commonly used in the literature; market Gini coefficient (GINIMARKET) and net Gini coefficient 
(GININET).5 The basic regression model that we aim to estimate can be expressed as follows: 
 
                          ln[𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡]  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln[𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡] + 𝛃𝟐
′ (𝑿𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + є𝑖,𝑡                              (1) 
 
where 𝑖 and  𝑡 are country and time indices, 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 represents the income inequality measure, 
𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 represents, alternatively, credit to non-financial corporations (TCF) and credit to households 
and non-profit institutions serving households (TCH), 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of control variables that 
include 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡, ln(𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡), ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡) and ln(𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡), 𝑓𝑖 and 𝑓𝑡 denote country and time 
fixed effects, respectively, and є𝑖,𝑡 is the usual error term. Finally, 𝑙𝑛 stands for the natural 
logarithm. Our main parameter of interest is 𝛽1, which approximately describes the percentage 
point change in income inequality measures as a response to one percentage point increase, 
alternatively, in firm credit and household credit.  
The growing body of literature claims that panel data sets tend to show cross-sectional 
dependence, which may arise from economic integration of countries, common shocks (such as 
financial, political and social shocks), and sometimes unobserved factors that eventually become 
the part of error (disturbance) term (Pesaran, 2004). Since traditional estimation methods have 
become inconsistent or inefficient in the presence of cross-sectional dependence, new techniques 
have been developed in panel data econometrics for stationarity and cointegration analysis and 
                                                          
5 See Section 2 for detailed definitions of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
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estimation procedure, which take account of cross-sectional dependence.6 To resolve this 
potential problem, we consecutively employ i) Bias-Adjusted CD test developed by Pesaran et al. 
(2008), ii) cross-sectionally augmented Im-Pesaran-Shin (CIPS) panel unit root test proposed by 
Pesaran (2007), iii) the second generation panel cointegration tests of LM Bootstrap test of 
Westerlund and Edgerton (2007), and Durbin-Hausman test of Westerlund (2008), which allow 
for the dependence of cross-sectional units, and iv) Common Correlated Effects (CCE) estimator 
proposed by Pesaran (2006), Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCEMG), and 
Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator proposed by Eberhardt and Bond (2009), which 
allows for cross-sectional dependency arising from multiple unobserved common factors.7 
4. Empirical Results 
As testing for cross-sectional dependence in panel data is necessary to decide on the estimation 
method, the first step of the empirical analysis is cross-sectional dependence (CD) tests to 
analyze the contemporaneous correlation across countries in the panel.8 Panel A and Panel B of 
Table 2 report the results of Bias-Adjusted CD test developed by Pesaran et al. (2008) for each 
series and for the models, respectively.9 The results imply that for both the models with intercept 
                                                          
6 Assuming that cross-sectional dependence is due to common unobserved components, but that they are 
uncorrelated with the included regressors, the Fixed-Effects (FE) and Random-Effects (RE) estimators are consistent, 
although not efficient, and the estimated standard errors are biased. However, if the common unobserved 
components are correlated with the included regressors, the FE and RE estimators are inconsistent and biased. See 
De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006).  
7 See Section 4 for detailed description and advantages of the employed models. 
8 Note that if the time dimension (T) is larger than the cross-sectional dimension (N) in a panel data set, CDLM1 test 
of Breusch and Pagan (1980) can be used to test for cross-sectional dependence. However, if N is larger than T in a 
panel, just as in this analysis (N=30, T=19), the CDLM1 test statistic does not attain desirable statistical properties as it 
shows considerable size distortions (Pesaran, 2004). We have utilized Bias-Adjusted CD test of Pesaran et al. (2008), 
since it exhibits a finite sample behavior, compared to CDLM2 and CDLM tests of Pesaran (2004); it successfully 
controls the size while maintaining satisfactory power in a panel with exogenous regressors. Bias-Adjusted CD test is 
consistent even when CDLM2 and CDLM tests are inconsistent. 
9 In Models 1, 2, 3 and 4, the dependent variable is GINIMARKET. The independent variable is TCF in Models 1 and 
2; Model 2, in addition, includes control variables. The independent variable is TCH in Models 3 and 4; Model 4, in 
addition, includes control variables. Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 are for robustness check, and they pursue the same 
ordering, where dependent variable is GININET. 
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and the models with intercept and trend, the test statistics reject the null hypothesis of no cross-
sectional dependence for all series and for the Models 1-8. 
TABLE 2. Cross-sectional Dependence Tests Results 
Panel A: For the Series Model with intercept Model with intercept&trend 
Variables  statistics p-values statistics p-values 
ln(𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) 1.584 0.057 2.736 0.003 
ln(𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) 3.038 0.001 3.428 0.000 
ln(𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡) 4.560 0.000 3.920 0.000 
ln(𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡) 3.150 0.001 5.557 0.000 
𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 3.671 0.000 3.770 0.000 
ln(𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡) 6.543 0.000 4.921 0.000 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡) 3.243 0.001 3.392 0.000 
ln(𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡) 3.137 0.001 2.656 0.004 
Panel B: For the Models         
Model 1 29.416 0.000 27.327 0.000 
Model 2 47.938 0.000 34.936 0.000 
Model 3 32.241 0.000 34.127 0.000 
Model 4 39.590 0.000 36.687 0.000 
Model 5 30.446 0.000 22.617 0.000 
Model 6 34.235 0.000 38.719 0.000 
Model 7 31.506 0.000 26.324 0.000 
Model 8 48.032 0.000 42.483 0.000 
Notes: In Models 1, 2, 3 and 4, the dependent variable is GINIMARKET. The independent variable is TCF in Models 
1 and 2; Model 2, in addition, includes control variables. The independent variable is TCH in Models 3 and 4; Model 
4, in addition, includes control variables. Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 are for robustness check, and they pursue the same 
ordering, where dependent variable is GININET. Bias-Adjusted CD tests the null of zero correlations in the case of 
panel models with strictly exogenous regressors and normal errors. The null hypothesis the test is the absence of 
cross-sectional dependence. 
 
Given the presence of cross-sectional dependence in the panel, the first generation unit 
root tests become invalid. Therefore, in order to analyze the stationarity features of the series, 
cross-sectionally augmented Im-Pesaran-Shin (CIPS) panel unit root test proposed by Pesaran 
(2007) is employed. The CIPS test statistics is the sample averages of the individual cross-
sectionally augmented ADF (CADF) statistics. The results of CIPS test for the panel are 
presented in Table 3. The CIPS test results indicate the failure to reject the null hypothesis of the 
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presence of unit root for all series for both the model with intercept and the model with intercept 
and trend. In other words, all series are found to be non-stationary processes for the panel. 
TABLE 3. CIPS Panel Unit Root Test Results 
Variables 
Model with intercept Model with intercept & trend 
statistics statistics 
ln(𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) -1.9225 -1.6800 
ln(𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) -1.9704 -2.4502 
ln(𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡) -1.3580 -1.2864 
ln(𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡) -1.9775 -2.3444 
𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 -1.909 -1.9185 
ln(𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡) -1.3851 -1.1518 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡) -2.0568 -2.5438 
ln(𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡) -1.9886 -2.3337 
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test is the presence of unit root in panel data with cross-sectional dependence in the 
form of common factor dependence. The critical values from Pesaran (2007, p.280-281, Tables 2.b and 2.c for N=30, 
T=20) are -2.32 (1%), -2.15 (5%), -2.07 (10%) for model with intercept; -2.83 (1%), -2.67 (5%), -2.58 (10%) for 
model with intercept and trend.  
 
After we confirm the non-stationarity of the variables for the panel, the subsequent step is 
to test for cointegration among the dependent variable and the regressors. Given the presence of 
cross-sectional dependence in the panel, the first generation panel cointegration tests also become 
invalid. Hence, the second generation panel cointegration tests are employed by allowing for the 
dependence of cross-sectional units. Particularly, LM Bootstrap test of Westerlund and Edgerton 
(2007), and Durbin-Hausman test of Westerlund (2008) are utilized to ensure the presence of 
cointegration in Models 1-8. Panel A and Panel B of Table 4 report the results of LM Bootstrap 
and Durbin-Hausman tests, respectively. There is a strong evidence of cointegration in Models 1-
8, since LM Bootstrap test results indicate the failure to reject the null hypothesis of the presence 
of cointegration, and Durbin-Hausman test results reveal the rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration.  
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TABLE 4. Panel Cointegration Tests Results 
  
Panel A: LM Bootstrap Test Panel B: Durbin-Hausman Test 
Model with intercept Model with intercept&trend dh_group dh_panel 
Model 1 3.911 (0.113) 3.728 (0.132) 11.873 (0.000) 4.738 (0.000) 
Model 2 36.611 (0.738) 67.484 (0.664) 2.985 (0.001) 7.015 (0.000) 
Model 3 2.290 (0.277) 2.611 (0.432) 11.766(0.000) 15.665 (0.000) 
Model 4 38.610 (0.609) 69.477 (0.909) 5.640 (0.000) 2.827 (0.002) 
Model 5 3.593 (0.107) 3.234 (0.182) 16.443 (0.000) 1.406 (0.080) 
Model 6 32.591 (0.958) 60.675 (0.870) 2.512 (0.006) 4.742 (0.000) 
Model 7 1.574 (0.557) 1.582 (0.475) 7.718 (0.000) 3.691 (0.000) 
Model 8 35.146 (0.774) 63.754 (0.929) 5.345 (0.000) 6.273 (0.000) 
Notes: The test statistics with p-values in parentheses are presented for LM Bootstrap test and Durbin-Hausman test 
in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. In Panel A, the critical value (95%) is based on the bootstrapped distribution 
with 5000 bootstrap replications. The bootstrap critical values are proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). The 
null hypothesis of LM Bootstrap test is the presence of cointegration in Models 1-8. The asymptotic p-values for the 
test are not presented, since they are computed on the assumption of cross-sectional independence. In Panel B, the 
panel statistic, denoted by dh_panel, is obtained by summing n individual terms before multiplying them together, 
whereas group mean statistic, denoted by dh_group, is obtained by first multiplying the various terms and then 
summing. The null hypothesis of Durbin-Hausman test is the absence of cointegration in Models 1-8. 
 
As we verify the presence of cointegration in our basic model, the long-run relationship in 
the panel regression model given in Equation (1) is further estimated by two methods for panel 
cointegration estimation. The cross-section augmented cointegrating regression for each country 
is estimated by Common Correlated Effects (CCE) estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006), and 
Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator proposed by Eberhardt and Bond (2009). The latter 
allows for cross-sectional dependency, which potentially arises from multiple unobserved 
common factors. The CCE estimation procedure is advantageous, since it enables augmenting the 
basic regression with cross-section averages of the dependent variable and the observed 
regressors as proxies for the unobserved common factors. The CCE estimation procedure is 
presented in Equation (2). 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡)  = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜁1 𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜁2?̅?𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖,𝑡 for 𝑖 =  1, … , 𝑁 and  𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇     (2) 
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where the coefficients 𝜁1 and 𝜁2 represent the elasticity estimates of  𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡)  with respect to 
the cross-section averages of 𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡) and the observed regressors, respectively. Accordingly, 
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡) [alternatively, 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡)] and 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 (in Equation 1) are contained in 𝑋𝑖,𝑡, and 𝜗𝑖𝑡 
denotes the error term. This procedure allows the individual countries to respond to common time 
effects differently as reflected by the country-specific coefficients on the cross-sectionally 
averaged variables. It also provides consistent estimates even when the observed regressors are 
correlated with the common factors. Using this procedure, the individual coefficients, 𝛾𝑖, can be 
estimated in a panel framework. The Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCEMG) 
estimation is a simple average of the individual CCE estimations. The CCEMG estimation 
procedure is shown in Equations (3) and (4). 
 
                                𝛾𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑀𝐺 = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑖 /𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1                                                                                 (3) 
                               𝑆𝐸(𝛾𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑀𝐺) = [∑ 𝜎 (𝛾𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1 ]/√𝑁                                (4) 
 
where 𝛾𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑀𝐺 and 𝑆𝐸(𝛾𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑀𝐺)  are the estimated CCEMG coefficients and their standard 
deviations, respectively. 
On the other hand, the AMG estimator regards time series data properties as well as the 
differences in the impact of observables and unobservables across panel groups. This estimator 
takes account the cross-sectional dependence through the involvement of a ‘common dynamic 
effect’ in the country regression, which is extracted from the year dummy coefficients (𝐷𝑡) of a 
pooled regression in first differences (FD-OLS), and represents the levels-equivalent mean 
evolvement of unobserved common factors across all countries (Eberhardt and Bond, 2009). 
Provided that the unobserved common factors compose part of the country-specific cointegrating 
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relation, the augmented country regression model embraces the cointegrating relationship that is 
allowed to differ across countries. In this regard, it coincides with the assumption of CCEMG 
estimator (Pedroni, 2007; Eberhardt and Bond, 2009).10 The first stage stands for a standard FD-
OLS regression with T-1 year dummies in first differences, from which the year dummy 
coefficients, relabeled as ?̂?𝑡
° , are collected. In the second stage, this variable is included in each of 
the N standard country regressions. Then, the AMG estimations are derived as averages of the 
individual country estimations. The first and the second stages of AMG estimation procedure are 
shown in Equations (5) and (6), respectively. 
 
           AMG – Stage (i)          ∆ ln(𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡)  = 𝛽
′∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑐𝑡∆𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=2                                (5) 
⇒ ?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡
° 
            AMG – Stage (ii)        ln(𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖
′𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖?̂?𝑡
° + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                              (6) 
?̂?𝐴𝑀𝐺 = 𝑁
−1 ∑ ?̂?𝑖
𝑖
 
 
where 𝜑𝑖 is constant, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 denotes the error term of stage (i) and stage (ii). ?̂?𝐴𝑀𝐺  stands for 
cross-sectional group-specific AMG estimations which are averaged across the panel. 
We start discussing our estimates with Table 5, which presents the results of the 
regression of log market Gini coefficient on log firm credit to GDP ratio (in columns 1, 2, 5, and 
6) and log household credit to GDP ratio (in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8) - along with the controls. The 
regressions show that there is a statistically significant relation between firm credit to GDP ratio 
and the market Gini coefficient, suggesting countries with higher level of firm credit to GDP ratio 
                                                          
10 Eberhardt and Bond (2009) compare the performance of AMG and CCEMG estimators through Monte Carlo 
simulations, and find robust results for both approaches. 
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experience lower income inequality. The results hold for both the CCEMG and AMG estimates. 
On the other hand, both the CCEMG and AMG estimates do not suggest a statistically 
meaningful correlation between household credit to GDP ratio and the market Gini coefficient. 
Among the control variables, only government expenditure to GDP ratio and trade to GDP ratio 
have statistically significant relation with the level of income inequality, where both have 
positive effects on the level of income inequality. These evidences imply that higher government 
spending and degree of openness of an economy may increase income inequality. 
TABLE 5. Mean Group Type Estimations (the market Gini Coefficient and Credit Compositions) 
Dependent Variable: 𝐥𝐧(𝑮𝑰𝑵𝑰𝑴𝑨𝑹𝑲𝑬𝑻𝒊,𝒕) 
Variables                        CCEMG                      AMG  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
ln(𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡) 
-0.113 
(0.036)*** 
-0.050 
(0.028)*   
-0.090 
(0.027)*** 
-0.063 
(0.267)**   
ln(𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡)   
0.057 
(0.070) 
-0.051 
(0.041)   
0.069 
(0.050) 
0.041 
(0.042) 
𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡  
0.001 
(0.006)  
-0.001 
(0.004)  
-0.002 
(0.007)  
0.000 
(0.007) 
ln(𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡)  
0.190 
(0.078)**  
-0.041 
(0.055)  
0.190 
(0.094)**  
0.135 
(0.100) 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡)  
-0.002 
(0.009)  
-0.008 
(0.010)  
-0.011 
(0.009)  
0.002 
(0.008) 
ln(𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡)  
0.054 
(0.071)  
-0.055 
(0.050)  
0.044 
(0.025)*  
0.042 
(0.029) 
Notes: The superscripts ***, **and * denote the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
In addition to the regressions with credit components, in Table 6, we present the results of 
the regression of log market Gini coefficient on total credit to private non-financial sectors as a 
percentage of GDP, which is the sum of household credit to GDP ratio and firm credit to GDP 
ratio, as defined in Section 2. This regression is estimated in order to examine the effect of total 
private credit on the level of income inequality to be able to compare our results with the existing 
literature on the finance-inequality nexus. Both the CCEMG and AMG estimates suggest a 
statistically insignificant relation between total credit to private non-financial sectors and the 
market Gini coefficient, though the relationship is negative. The estimates confirm our hypothesis 
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that the composition of total private credit is more important than its size in reducing income 
inequality. 
TABLE 6. Mean Group Type Estimations (the market Gini Coefficient and Total Private Credit) 
Dependent Variable: 𝐥𝐧(𝑮𝑰𝑵𝑰𝑴𝑨𝑹𝑲𝑬𝑻𝒊,𝒕) 
Variables CCEMG AMG 
ln(𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡) 
-0.038 
(0.038) 
-0.049 
(0.033) 
𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 
-0.0002 
(0.006) 
-0.0003 
(0.007) 
ln(𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡) 
0.122 
(0.072)* 
0.146 
(0.064)** 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
ln(𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡) 
0.005 
(0.061) 
0.044 
(0.030) 
Notes: The superscripts ***, **and * denote the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
We also explore the relation between credit components and the net Gini coefficient 
(GININET). The nature of analysis is same as the one executed in Table 5. Similar to Table 5, the 
CCEMG and AMG estimates suggest a negative and statistically significant relation between 
firm credit to GDP ratio and the net Gini coefficient, while the relationship is statistically 
insignificant for household credit to GDP ratio.11 
In addition to the panel estimates, the cross-section augmented cointegrating regression 
for each country is also estimated by CCE and AMG estimators. Table 7 presents the signs of the 
coefficients regarding the regressions between (i) firm credit and income inequality, and (ii) 
household credit and income inequality, using CCE and AMG estimators, respectively. The 
results show that though household credit is negatively and significantly associated with the 
market Gini coefficient in some countries (e.g., Greece, Israel, Poland and Spain), it increases 
income inequality in most of the countries (e.g., Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong, 
                                                          
11 All stationary, unit-root, panel cointegration, and long-run relationship tests are employed for the regressions 
between credit components and the net Gini coefficient. We do not present all results here in order to conserve space, 
but available upon request from the authors. 
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Hungary, Sweden). On the other hand, the relationship between firm credit and the market Gini 
coefficient is weak but negative in most of the countries. However these evidences should be 
interpreted with caution due to data constraints in the sample countries, we may suggest that 
country level credit decomposition-inequality analysis may enrich the empirical literature. 
TABLE 7. Country-specific Regressions (summary of the Sign of the Coefficients) 
Dependent Variable: 𝐥𝐧(𝑮𝑰𝑵𝑰𝑴𝑨𝑹𝑲𝑬𝑻𝒊,𝒕) 
Country                        CCE                     AMG  
 TCF TCH TCF TCH 
Argentina + + + - 
Australia + - + - 
Austria     (-) * - + - 
Belgium -        (+) *** -        (+) *** 
Brazil -        (-) *** +        (+) *** 
Canada -         (+) *** +        (+) *** 
Czech Republic - - - - 
Denmark -         (+) ***      (-) ** - 
Finland + - + + 
France - - - + 
Germany        (+) *** -      (+) ** + 
Greece - + -       (-) *** 
Hong Kong     (+) *      (+) **      (-) ** + 
Hungary + - +        (+) *** 
Israel -        (-) *** + - 
Italy - - - - 
Japan + - - + 
Republic of Korea - -        (-) *** + 
Mexico + - - - 
Netherlands - -      (-) ** + 
Norway +     (-) ** - + 
Poland -       (-) ***        (-) ***        (-) *** 
Portugal - - - - 
Singapore - + - - 
Spain -       (-) ***        (-) ***        (-) *** 
Sweden - + +      (+) ** 
Thailand + + + + 
Turkey + - +    (-) * 
United Kingdom      (-) ** + -        (-) *** 
United States - -        (-) ***        (-) *** 
Notes: The superscripts ***, **and * denote the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
There are numerous studies investigating the link between financial development and economic 
growth. However, there is a scarcity of research on the relation between finance and income 
inequality, most of which focuses on the size of total credit given to the private sector. Although 
private credit is vital for the real economy, the ratio of household credit to firm credit is above 0.5 
in many developed and developing countries in our sample, and an increasing proportion of 
private credit has been given to the households rather than entrepreneurs over the last two 
decades. Since these two types of borrowers, namely households and entrepreneurs, vary in terms 
of the use of credit, they might have different effects on the level of income inequality. Therefore, 
the main purpose of this paper is to specifically focus on the distinction between household and 
firm credit, and investigate whether these two types of credit have asymmetric effects on income 
inequality in a sample of 30 developed and developing countries over the period 1995-2013. In 
addition, we test the impact of total credit to private non-financial sectors to GDP ratio on the 
level of income inequality in order to motivate our main hypothesis that not the size of private 
credit but the composition of it matters for reducing income inequality. Our analysis also pays 
special attention to cross-sectional dependence issues, which are mostly ignored by the existing 
literature, and aims to present robust estimates on the role of credit components in reducing 
income inequality. 
Our main finding is that firm credit reduces income inequality whereas there is no 
significant impact of household credit on the level of income inequality. This suggests that 
countries with low levels of firm credit in the non-financial sectors can experience lower income 
inequality by implementing policies encouraging firm credit expansion. On the other hand, 
countries with relatively high levels of household credit should implement policies discouraging 
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household credit expansion, and encouraging firm credit expansion, taking into account the issue 
of over-expansion of private credit. We also find that total credit to private non-financial sectors 
is negatively but insignificantly associated with the market Gini coefficient, suggesting that there 
is no statistically significant effect of total credit on income inequality. Our results also suggest 
that while government consumption expenditure to GDP ratio and trade openness have positive 
associations with the level of income inequality, there is no statistically significant impact of 
either corruption index or foreign direct investment to GDP ratio on income inequality.  
We conclude that not the size of private credit but the composition of it matters for 
reducing income inequality, and more credit may not always be good for the poor. Since 
household and firm credit have different effects on the level of income inequality, the 
composition of private credit becomes even more important. This makes policymakers to pay 
particular attention to the asymmetric effects that household and firm credit have on income 
inequality when they are establishing sector-specific credit policy.  
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